Time-sensitive Information Flow Control in Timed Event-B by Mu, Chunyan & Qin, Shengchao
Time-sensitive Information Flow Control in Timed Event-B
Chunyan Mu and Shengchao Qin
School of Computing, Teesside University, UK
Email: c.mu@tees.ac.uk, s.qin@tees.ac.uk
Abstract—Protecting confidential data in today’s comput-
ing environments is an important problem. Information flow
control can help to avoid information leakage and violations
introduced by executing the software applications. In software
development cycle, it is important to handle security related
issues from the beginning specifications at the level of abstract.
Mu [1] investigated the problem of preserving information flow
security in the Event-B specification models. A typed Event-
B model was presented to enforce information flow security
and to prevent direct flows introduced by the system. However,
in practice, timing behaviours of programs can also introduce
a covert flow. The problem of run-time flow monitoring and
controlling must also be addressed. This paper investigates
information flow control in the Event-B specification language
with timing constructs. We present a timed Event-B system
by introducing timers and relevant time constraints into the
system events. We suggest a time-sensitive flow security condi-
tion for the timed Event-B systems, and present a type system
to close the covert channels of timing flows for the system by
ensuring the security condition. We then investigate how to
refine timed events during the stepwise refinement modelling
to satisfy the security condition.
Keywords-flow, security, time, Event-B, refinement.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security threats are everywhere in today’s digital life. We
often access software applications from untrusted sources,
provide private and sensitive data and also have to grant
them access permission over the internet. By communicating
and observing the running of the software application, the
attacker can inflict damage such as stealing information
stored in the affected systems. Protecting confidential data
in computing environments is an important and difficult
problem. Information flow control aims to avoid informa-
tion leakage and violations introduced by executing the
programs, and defend attacks from the application level.
Software applications are usually modelled using higher
level specification languages before being implemented in
programming languages. In the software development cycle,
it is important to handle security related issues from the
very beginning, e.g. when dealing with specifications at the
level of abstract. Mu [1] investigated the problem of pre-
serving information flow security in Event-B specification
models and during the procedure of refinement. A typed
Event-B model was presented to enforce information flow
security and prevent explicit and implicit flow introduced
by the system. Information flow control considered in [1]
focused on the interference among variables with different
security levels when executing the model events but without
considering information release via timing side channels.
Timing behaviours of programs can also introduce a covert
flow and bring serious threats to the security of software
systems. By analysing the execution time of a software
system, an attacker may be able to deduce information about
the secret components. Therefore, run-time information flow
monitoring and controlling should also be addressed. This
paper aims to study time-sensitive analysis and control of
information flow in the Event-B specification language, built
on top of the work in [1].
Consider the execution of a software application down-
loaded from an untrusted site, attackers can partially ob-
serve the execution of the application. Specifically, they can
observe a (possibly infinite) sequence of timed observable
events, i.e., when does an event take place and what is the
value of the observable outputs of that event. By observing
the timing and communicating behaviours of the system,
secret information flows to the attacker through direct and
side communication channels. Semantic security policies are
required to ensure the observable time-sensitive behaviours
to be independent of secret information manipulated by
the program, and enforcement mechanisms are required to
guarantee the programs satisfy the policies.
In this paper, we model the system in an extended finite
event system for this goal. We extend Event-B models
with branch and timing constructs. The extended Event-B
model can be used to model real-time systems and analyse
time-sensitive information flow through the system. The
executions of the model can be viewed as a set of infinite
sequences of timed events. Each execution trace is attached
with a sequence of times such that the time of the occurrence
of the ith event of the trace is recorded as the ith element
of the time sequence. Specifically, we present the semantics
of the timed Event-B specification language, to support
automated reasoning about timing flow sensitive systems.
By incorporating timers and timing constraints into Event-B
machines, the timed machines can then accept time event
sequences in which each event is associated with the time
of its occurrence. A timed Event-B system can then capture
interesting run-time properties for timing flow analysis and
control.
Our main contributions are summarised as follows. First,
we present the language of Event-B models with timing
and branch constructs, and introduce the relevant semantic
security conditions for the purpose of timing flow analysis
and control. Second, we present a type system for the timed
Event-B models to ensure the flow security condition. Third,
we extend the refinement rules to preserve timing flow
security under stepwise refinement.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II
reviews the core Event-B models with an additional branch
construct to facilitate flow analysis. Section III introduces the
timed Event-B language, and presents the timing flow secu-
rity condition. Section IV studies time-sensitive information
flow analysis in the timed Event-B systems, and presents
a type system to ensure the security condition. In Section
V, we investigate the problem of preserving timing security
properties and timing constructs under refinement. Section
VI presents related work, followed by some concluding
remarks.
II. EVENT B WITH BRANCH CONSTRUCT
Event-B [2] is a formal language for flexible system
development via stepwise refinement. The framework sup-
ports mechanised proofs and steps for refining, splitting
existing events and introducing new events. All such steps
are accompanied with mechanised proof obligations which
make the verification process efficient. An Event-B model
includes two main parts: a context specifies the static part
and a machine specifies the dynamic part of the system.
A machine specification normally consists of a list of
model variables denoted by v, state invariants I(v), and
a set of model events EVT:
Machine M
var v
invariant I(v)
EVT init, evt0, ...
end
where v defines the state variables of the system, I(v)
defines the global specification of the state variables, and
EVT describes all possible updates to the machine state. A
machine M is accompanied with consistency proof obliga-
tions such that the events preserve the invariant.
Specifically, an event is a “guarded command” consisting
of a guard G(v) over the variables, and a generalised
substitution action (the body) A(v). We consider the events
in the following form:
EVT , when G(v) then A(v)
where the action (body) A(v) is used to update the state of
the machine. The effect of the body defines a “before-after
predicate” Φ(v,v′) describing state updates of variables
upon event execution, in terms of the relationship between
the variable values before (v) and after (v′) the action
has occurred. The execution of the body ensures that the
predicate Φ(v,v′) is met.
To reason about time-sensitive flow analysis, we define
the branch construct with the restriction using the choice
operator []. The branch construct defines a choice between
a pair of mutually exclusive events:
EVT , when G(v) then A(v) [] when ¬G(v) then A′(v)
The branch specification can be considered as an if state-
ment in the common sequential language:
if G(v) then A(v) else A′(v)
The substitution actions of the core Event-B model include:
A ::= skip
∣∣∣∣ x := e x :∈ S z : |P x,y := e, f
The event actions can be viewed as transformation functions
which update the model state. Specifically, skip denotes the
empty set of actions for an event, the state is unchanged
under the skip action; x := e denotes the assignment,
i.e., state is updated by replacing free occurrences of x by e:
where x ⊆ VAR is a sequence of variables, and e denotes a
number of set-theoretic expressions corresponding to each of
the variables in x; x :∈ S denotes that we update the state by
arbitrarily choosing values from the set S for the variables
in x, i.e., x becomes a member of S; z : |P denotes that
we update the state by arbitrarily choosing values for the
variables in z that satisfy the predicate P , i.e., x becomes
such that the predicate P holds; x,y := e, f denotes a
concurrent assignment of the values e and f to the variable
sequences x and y respectively.
III. TIMED EVENT B SYSTEM AND FLOW SECURITY
CONDITION
A. The language
We extend Event B machines with timing aspects to
support automated analysis, reasoning about, and eventually
controlling time-sensitive information flows. We consider
the form of the evaluation judgements for actions as:
〈[[A]],Σ〉
ι
−→ Σ′ where Σ is the state space associating model
variables with values, ι is the time taken to make this state
transition. Specifically, time expression ι can be any of the
following regarding to the action taken: ιe denote the time
taken to evaluate expression e; ι[[:=]] denote the time taken
to make a single assignment; ι[[:∈]] denote the time taken
to randomly choose values from a set; ι[[:|]] denote the time
taken to randomly choose values satisfying a predicate; ιG
denote the time taken to judge a guard G; we also use ιA
and ιE to denote the time taken to perform action A and
event E in general. We therefore incorporate a notion of
execution time into the semantics. Table I presents the rules
for the evaluation of model events.
B. Timed event sequences
We model the system in an extended finite event system
with timing constructs. The executions of the model can
be viewed as a set of infinite sequences of events. Each
execution trace is attached with a sequence of times such that
the time occurred by the ith event of the trace is recorded
(Event)
Σ ⊢ G ⇓ true
〈when G then A,Σ〉
ιG+ιA−−−−−→ Σ[A]
Σ ⊢ G ⇓ false
〈when G then A,Σ〉
ιG−−→ Σ
(BranchEvent)
Σ ⊢ G ⇓ true
〈when G(v) then A(v) [] when ¬G(v) then A′(v),Σ〉
ιG+ιA−−−−−→ Σ[A]
Σ ⊢ G ⇓ false
〈when G(v) then A(v) [] when ¬G(v) then A′(v),Σ〉
ιG+ιA′−−−−−→ Σ[A′]
(Skip)
〈skip,Σ〉
0
−→ Σ
(Assignment)
Σ ⊢ e ⇓ w
〈x := e,Σ〉
ιe+ι[[:=]]·|x|+ιx
−−−−−−−−−−−→ Σ[x = w]
(ChoiceFromSet)
Σ ⊢ S ⇓ {si | si ∈ S, 1 ≤ i ≤ |x|}
〈x :∈ S,Σ〉
ι[[:∈]]+ι[[:=]]·|x|+ιx
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Σ[x = {si | 1 ≤ i ≤ |x|}]
(ChoiceByPredicate)
Σ ⊢ P ⇓ {xi | xi |= P, 1 ≤ i ≤ |z|}
〈z : |P,Σ〉
ι[[:|]]+ι[[:=]]·|z|+ιz
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Σ[z = {xi | 1 ≤ i ≤ |z|}]
(MultipleAction)
Σ ⊢ e1 ⇓ w1, e2 ⇓ w2
〈x,y := e1, e2; Σ〉
ι[[:=]]·|x|+ι[[:=]]·|y|+ιe1+ιe2+ιx+ιy
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Σ[x = w1,y = w2]
Table I
SEMANTICS: RULES FOR THE EVALUATION OF TIMED MODEL EVENT.
as the ith element of the time sequence. By incorporating
timers and timing constraints into Event B machines, the
timed machines can then accept time event sequences in
which each event is associated with the time taken and thus
the time of its occurrence. A timed Event-B system can
then capture interesting flow properties introduced by timing
channels.
A timed event sequence is a pair (e, c) where e =
e1e2 . . . is an infinite event sequence, c = c0c1c2 . . . is
a time sequence, and ei occurs at clock ci, i.e., ei takes
the time of ci+1−ci, where c0 = α denotes that e starts at
time α. With each event, we associate the guard with time
constraints, and require that the event is taken only if the
current values of the clocks satisfy this constraint:
EVT , when G(v, c) then A(v).
The definition for a timed event sequence is as follows.
Definition 1 (Timed event sequence): A timed event se-
quence is defined as: ρ = (M, c), where M = e1e2 . . . en,
c = c1 . . . , and ci = c(ei) (i≥1) denotes the time instant ei
occurs.
C. Time-sensitive flow security condition
To reason about flow analysis, we assign security levels
to model objects. Given a timed Event-B model, all entities
are built from a set of timed events, each of which is defined
in terms of substitution actions on model variables and
recordings on event timers. Each variable is thus assigned
with a security level. The powerset of model variables
therefore forms a complete lattice L, where the partial
ordering is regarding to the security levels of the model
variables: ∀v1, v2 ∈ VAR, v1  v2 iff τ1 ⊑sec τ2, where 
denotes the partial ordering on VAR, and τ1 = τ(v1), τ2 =
τ(v2) ∈ L denote the security levels of variables v1 and v2
respectively. Execution of model events causes interference
between model variables and thus a flow through the security
lattice. A model is considered secure if all the flows in the
model satisfy its flow policy. This section studies the timing
flow policy that a secure model should satisfy.
First let us look at a simple example to see how timing
behaviours can introduce leakage.
Example 1: Consider a simple Event-B model as follows.
variables high, low1 , low2
invariants low1 , low2 ∈ Z, high ∈ {−1, 0, 1}
initialisation low1 := −1 low2 := −1 high := −1
events
INIT , (when true then low1 , low2 := 0, 0)
EVT1 , (when (low1 == 0) then high :∈ {0, 1})
EVT2 , (when (high == 1)
then low1 , low2 := low1 + 2, low1 )
[](when (high == 0)
then low1 := 2)
Assume that low1 , low2  high . Note that low1 (low2 ) will
always be 2 (0) at the end and no secret data is leaked by
observing the low output. However the program may leak
the value of high via its timing behaviour since the execution
time is dependent on the value of high from the observer’s
view.
To capture time-sensitive flow leakage, we define the
security condition for timed Event-B models based on equiv-
alence relations from the observer’s view.
Definition 2 (L-equivalent state space): We say state
space Σ1 and Σ2 are L-equivalent, written as Σ1 =L Σ2 iff
DOM(Σ1) = DOM(Σ2) ∧ ∀x ∈ DOM(Σ1).τ(x) ≤ L
⇒ Σ1(x) = Σ2(x).
Definition 3 (L-bisimulation ∼L): Consider two timed
event sequences:
ρ1 = (M1, c1) = 〈E10, (Σ10, c10)〉 → . . . ,
ρ2 = (M2, c2) = 〈E20, (Σ20, c20)〉 → . . . ,
∀Σ10,Σ20 such that Σ10 =L Σ20, and c10 = c20, we say
ρ1 ∼L ρ2 if:
∀j ∈ {1, . . . }.(Σ1j =L Σ2j) ∧ (c1j = c2j).
Definition 4 (Timing flow security condition φsec): A
model M is considered timing flow secure, written as
M |= φsec, if for a given public security level L:
∀ρ1, ρ2 ∈ (M, c).ρ1 ∼L ρ2.
Consider again the timed events in Example 1. There are
two possible event sequences regarding to the input value of
high .
ρ1 = 〈INIT, (Σ(low1 , low2 = −1, high = −1), c10 = 0)〉 →
〈EVT1, (Σ(low1 , low2 = 0, high = −1), c11 = 2× ι[[:=]]+ιlow1 +ιlow2 )〉 →
〈EVT2, (Σ(low1 , low2 = 0, high = 1), c12 = c11+ι[[:∈]]+ιhigh)〉 →
(Σ(low1 = 2, low2 = 0, high = 1),
c13 = c12 + 2× ι[[:=]]+2× ιlow1 +ι(low1+2))
ρ2 = 〈INIT, (Σ(low1 , low2 = −1, high = −1), c20 = 0)〉 →
〈EVT1, (Σ(low1 , low2 = 0, high = −1), c21 = 2× ι[[:=]]+ιlow1 +ιlow2 )〉 →
〈EVT2, (Σ(low1 , low2 = 0, high = 0), c22 = c21+ι[[:∈]]+ιhigh)〉 →
(Σ(low1 = 2, low2 = 0, high = 0), c23 = c22 + ι[[:=]])
Note that the model leaks information via its timing channel,
since the amount of the time taken is dependent on the value
of high .
IV. TYPE SYSTEM FOR FLOW CONTROL IN TIMED EVENT
B SYSTEMS
This section presents a type system that closes any covert
channels of timing information flows for the model by
ensuring the security condition.
A. Type checking for information flow control
Event actions may cause information to flow among
variables. Secure information flow is described by a secure
information flow predicate using typing rules. Let L be the
finite flow lattice. τ ⊆ L denotes a sequence of security
levels in L related to a sequence x of variables with the
same length: |τ | = |x|. The security typing environment is
considered as: Γ : VAR → L. In a model event, for an action
A, judgements have the form: τ ⊢ Γ{A(x)}Γ′, where the
type τ denotes the counter level of the variable sequence
x regarding to the action A(x) being executed to eliminate
implicit flows from the guard, Γ and Γ′ describe the security
levels of the identifiers which hold before and after the
execution of A. The derivation rules of model events enforce
that only variables with types greater than or equal to τ are
allowed to be updated by action A.
Model events can influence each other and introduce
information flows. In addition to the dependence relationship
discussed in [1], the branch specification might introduce
implicit and timing flows when branch on high data (Ex-
ample 1). To close such flows, we need to ensure that
the external observer cannot deduce which branch is taken,
i.e., A ∼L A
′ for the observable security level L.
Table II presents security typing rules for specifying time-
sensitive secure information flow predicates of events, as an
extension of the type system presented in [1]. Notation Γ ⊢
e : t denotes that under the type environment Γ, expression
e has type t. The type of an expression (including guard
expression) is defined by taking the least upper bound of
the types of its free variables:
Γ ⊢ e : t iff t =
⊔
v∈fv(e)
Γ(v)
A flow secure program should only safely branch on
sensitive data if the public observer is not able to determine
which branch was taken. Rule TBranchEvent1 specifies the
case that guard G contains higher level data. For this case,
we need to ensure that A ∼L A
′.
Theorem 1 (Soundness of the type system): A timed
Event-B model M is secure if the events satisfy the security
properties, which are guarded by the typing rules defined
in Table II:
τ ⊢L Γ{M}Γ
′ ⇒M |= φsec
Proof:We need to prove that, forM s.t. τ ⊢L Γ{M}Γ
′:
∀ρ1, ρ2 ∈ (M, c).ρ1 ∼L ρ2
regarding to the security condition defined in Definition 4,
where ρ1, ρ2 are any two timed event executions of M , say:
ρi = 〈Ei0, (Σi0, ci0)〉 → · · · → (Σin, cin)
and for i = 1, 2, Ei0 . . . Ein−1 is a sequence of events of
M . By Definition 3, this is equivalent to prove that:
∀j ∈ {0, . . . , n}.(Σ1j =L Σ2j) ∧ (c1j = c2j).
By Definition 2, we write the equivalent semantic security
relation as:
τ |=L Γ{Eij}Γ
′,
(TSub)
τ1 ⊢ Γ1{EVT}Γ′1
τ2 ⊢ Γ2{EVT}Γ′2
τ2 ⊑sec τ1, Γ2 ⊑sec Γ1, Γ′1 ⊑sec Γ
′
2
(TEvent)
Γ ⊢ G : t t ⊔ τ ⊢ Γ{A}Γ′
τ ⊢ Γ{when G then A}Γ′
(TBranchEvent1)
Γ ⊢ G : t ⊐ τ t ⊢ Γ{A}Γ′ t ⊢ Γ{A′}Γ′
τ ⊢ Γ{when G then A; when ¬G then A′}Γ′
A ∼L A
′
(TBranchEvent2)
Γ ⊢ G : t ⊑ τ t ⊢ Γ{A}Γ′ t ⊢ Γ{A′}Γ′
τ ⊢ Γ{when G then A; when ¬G then A′}Γ′
(TDepEvts)
Γ0{EVT1}Γ1 Γ1{EVT2}Γ2 . . . Γn−1{EVTn}Γn
Γ{EVT1 ⊲ EVT2 ⊲ · · ·⊲ EVTn}Γn
(TSkip)
τ ⊢ Γ{skip}Γ
(TAssign)
Γ ⊢ e : τ ′
τ ⊢ Γ{x := e}Γ′(x 7→ τ ⊔ τ ′)
(TChoiceFromSet)
t =
⊔
s∈S Γ(s) τ
′ = t ∧ |τ ′| = |x|
τ ⊢ Γ{x :∈ S}Γ′(x 7→ τ ⊔ τ ′)
(TChoiceByPredicate)
t =
⊔
v∈fv(P ) Γ(v) Γ ⊢ P : τ
′ = t
τ ⊢ Γ{x : |P}Γ′(x 7→ τ ⊔ τ ′)
(TMultipleAction)
Γ ⊢ :τ1 Γ ⊢ f : τ2
τ ⊢ Γ{x,y := e, f}Γ′(x 7→ τ ⊔ τ1,y 7→ τ ⊔ τ2)
({x} ∩ {y} = ∅)
Γ ⊢ e : τ1 Γ ⊢ f : τ2
τ ⊢ Γ{x,y := e, f}
Γ′
(
{vi} 7→ τ({vi}) ⊔ τ1({vi}) ⊔ τ2({vi}),
x \ {vi} 7→ τ(x \ {vi}) ⊔ τ1(x \ {vi}),
y \ {vi} 7→ τ(y \ {vi}) ⊔ τ2(y \ {vi})
)
({x} ∩ {y} = {vi}) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
Table II
TYPING RULES FOR MODEL EVENTS WITH TIMING-SENSITIVE INFORMATION FLOW CONTROL
which holds iff : ∀Σij ,Σij+1, x ∈ VAR, τ(x) ≤ L, i = 1, 2
and for Σ10 =L Σ20, if:
〈Eij , (Σij , cij)〉 ⇓ (Σij+1, cij+1)
then:
(Γ′(x) ⊑ Γ(x) ∨ Σ1j+1(x) = Σ2j+1(x)) ∧ (c1j+1 = c2j+1).
The proof is then concluded by induction on the depth of
the typing derivation.
V. TIMING FLOW CONTROL UNDER REFINEMENT
In this section, we investigate how to check that the
specification is consistent with the flow policy and that the
security properties are preserved under refinement. Specifi-
cally, we are interested in preserving the security condition
under vertical refinement between a higher level abstract
machine and a relatively concrete one.
A system specification model M ′ is a refinement of
a specification model M if and only if M ′ ⊑ref M .
Intuitively, M ′ is more accurate or less abstract than M .
M is secure if the events satisfy the security properties
which are guarded by the typing rules defined in Table
II. However, by the definition of refinement there is no
guarantee that a refinement of M will preserve the security
properties since the refined model might introduce new or
merge existing events. Therefore, secure information flow
properties are not always preserved by refinement. The
reason for this is that the secure flow properties and the
relevant typing rules depend on the semantics of events
and the type environment, which cannot guarantee that the
refinement transformation preserve the security properties
of interest. Even the security requirement can be viewed
as security predicates, some of the events and their actions
that satisfy the rules may be removed or merged during the
refinement. Therefore, proving the security property at one
abstract level is not enough in general. Relevant security
properties must be proven again at the concrete level or
ensured via the refinement transformation to guarantee that
these additional behaviours introduced via refinement do not
violate security flow policy. In this section, we study the
problem of preserving security properties under refinement
transformation. We extend the secure refinement rules of
events presented in [1] in order to prove that a refinement
is both timing flow-sensitive secure and correct.
Refinement provides a way to construct stronger invariants
and add details in a way to enrich it step by step. This is
generally achieved by extending the list of state variables,
by merging and refining existing events, and by adding new
events. Specifically, assume the lower level model denoted
by MC has a collection of state variables denoted by vC ,
which is distinct from the collection of variables denoted
by vA in the abstract model denoted by MA. The abstract
variables vA and the concrete ones vC are linked together
by means of gluing invariant J(vA,vC): it “glues” the
state of the concrete model MC to that of its abstraction
MA. For any variable in abstract (concrete) machine if
there is no glued variable in the relevant concrete (abstract)
machine, we introduce a virtual variable denoted by ⊥ to
represent it, i.e., we extend the set of the variables such that:
VAR∗A = VARA ∪ {⊥}, and VAR
∗
C = VARC ∪ {⊥}. For our
purpose of security concern, we introduce virtual variables
called ⊥ to denote the glued variable which is empty in the
abstract (concrete) machine regarding to gluing variable in
the relevant concrete (abstract) machine. Furthermore, a vari-
ant V is introduced to prevent executions “non-terminating”:
V has to be decreased by every convergent event and
must not be increased by anticipated events. Assume the
type environments for abstract event and concrete event
are denoted as ΓA and ΓC respectively. We extend the
refinement laws [1] to incorporate rules w.r.t. time-sensitive
security properties in Table III. For clear cases, we use
Ψ(v,v′) to denote the before and after states of variable(s)
v instead of writing Ψ(Σ(v),Σ′(v)).
Assume abstract event EA with guard GA(vA, cA) and
before-and-after predicate ΨA(vA,v
′
A) in MA is refined to
a relevant concrete event EC with guard GC(vC , cC) and
before-and-after predicate ΨC(vC ,v
′
C) in MC . Let τA ⊆ LA
be a sequence of security levels of the sequence of variables
vA and τC ⊆ LC be a sequence of security levels of the
sequence of variables vC . We say τC ⊑sec τA, iff :
∀va ∈ vA, vc ∈ vC , J(va, vc) ∈ J(vA,vC)⇒ τc ⊑sec τa.
Specifically, BranchEvtSec-REF specifies the secure refine-
ment for branch events. The rule ensures that the actions
in true branch and false branch are L-bisimilar to each
other, and thus the external observer cannot determine which
branch is taken when branching on high data. We briefly
review the rest of the refinement rules discussed in [1] for
consistence. SubSec-REF ensures that for glued variables,
the security level of variables in the concrete event will not
be higher than that of their glued variables in the abstract
event. FisSec-REF ensures that the refined event is feasible
and there is no unauthorised flow introduced by the before-
after predicate. GrdSec-REF and InvSec-REF ensure that
the concrete event is a correctly refined event regarding to
the abstract one and the security level of the corresponding
variables will not be higher than that of the glued ones
in the abstract event. MergeSec-REF specifies the secure
refinement for merging existing events. Several abstract
events can be merged being refined to a single concrete
event. New events might be introduced in a refinement.
NewEvSec-REF ensures that adding new event during the
refinement will not introduce secure information flow and
will be correct. As usual, each new event refines an implicit
skip event which satisfies the security typing rules, and the
non-divergence rule.
VI. RELATED WORK
This paper studied the problem of time-sensitive secure
information flow control in Event-B specifications. The
notion of secure information flow specifies the security
requirements of the system where there should be no infor-
mation flow from the sensitive data to the observer. Denning
and Denning [3] first use program analysis to investigate
if the information flow properties of a program satisfy a
specified multi-level security policy. The most commonly
used flow police is non-interference [4]. A program satisfies
the non-interference property if its low security outputs do
not depend on the high security inputs. Note that under the
view of non-interference property, the program is viewed
as a function from input to output. Therefore, information
can still be leaked to the external observer through timing
channels.
Security type systems have been substantially used to
formulate the analysis of secure information flow and en-
force the non-interference property in programs. Hunt and
Sands [5] present a type system for information flow control
in a while language. In [5], sensitive information is stored in
programming variables, the powerset of program variables
thus forms the universal lattice. Their flow-sensitive type
system is defined by a family of inference systems which is
forced to satisfy a simple non-interference property. Their
further work [6] shows how flow-sensitive multi-level secu-
rity typing can be achieved in polynomial time. However,
no timing leakage has been considered in their works.
There are a number of works dealing with time-sensitive
notions of secure information flow for programming lan-
guages by using security type systems. Volpano and
Smith [7] propose a type-based approach that prevents
information flow leakage by enforcing the non-interference
police. Timing leaks to external observers are closed by
enforcing both branching and looping conditions to be
independent of sensitive data in sequential programs. They
then investigate flow security in a multi-threaded language
by enforcing the same condition to close the flow leak-
age through termination behaviour [8]. Furthermore, the
same authors have also studied the issue of timing leak-
ages through the probabilistic behaviours scheduling among
concurrent threads in [9]. Sabelfeld and Sands [10] ex-
plore external timing-sensitive security conditions for multi-
(SubSec-REF) I(vA) ∧ J(vA,vC) ∧ (ΓA ⊢ vA : τA) ∧ (ΓC ⊢ vC : τC) =⇒ τC ⊑sec τA
(FisSec-REF) I(vA) ∧ J(vA,vC) ∧ GC(vC , cC) ∧ (ΓC ⊢ vC : τC) ∧ (Γ
′
C ⊢ v
′
C : τ
′
C) =⇒ ∃v
′
C .ΨC(vC , v
′
C) ∧ (τ
′
C ⊑sec τC)
(GrdSec-REF) I(vA) ∧ J(vA, vC) ∧ GC(vC , cC) ∧ (ΓC ⊢ GC(vC , cC) : τC) ∧ (ΓA ⊢ GA(vA, cA) : τA) =⇒ GA(vA, cA) ∧ (τC ⊑sec τA)
(InvSec-REF) I(vA) ∧ J(vA,vC) ∧ GC(vC , cC) ∧ ΨC(vC ,v
′
C) ∧ (ΓC ⊢ vC : τC ,Γ
′
C ⊢ v
′
C : τ
′
C) ∧ (ΓA ⊢ vA : τA,Γ
′
A ⊢ v
′
A : τ
′
A)
=⇒ ∃v′A.(ΨA(vA,v
′
A) ∧ J(v
′
A,v
′
C)) ∧ (τ
′
C ⊑sec τC ⊑sec τA) ∧ (τ
′
C ⊑sec τ
′
A ⊑sec τA)
(Branch1Sec-REF) (E , when G(v, c) then A(v) [] when ¬G(v, c) then A′(v) end) ∧ I(vA) ∧ J(vA,vC) ∧ GC(vC , cC) ∧
(ΓC ⊢ vC : τC) ∧ (ΓA ⊢ vA : τA) ∧ (ΓC ⊢ GC : tC) ∧ (ΓA ⊢ GA : tA) ∧ tA ⊒sec τA ∧ tC ⊒sec τC
=⇒ GA(vA, cA) ∧ (AC(vC) ∼L A
′
C(vC)) ∧ (AA(vA) ∼L A
′
A(vA)) ∧ (τC ⊑sec τA)
(Branch2Sec-REF) (E , when G(v, c) then A(v) [] when ¬G(v, c) then A′(v) end) ∧ I(vA) ∧ J(vA,vC) ∧ ¬GC(vC , cC) ∧
(ΓC ⊢ vC : τC) ∧ (ΓA ⊢ vA : τA) ∧ (ΓC ⊢ GC : tC) ∧ (ΓA ⊢ GA : tA) ∧ tA ⊒sec τA ∧ tC ⊒sec τC
=⇒ ¬GA(vA, cA) ∧ (AC(vC) ∼L A
′
C(vC)) ∧ (AA(vA) ∼L A
′
A(vA)) ∧ (τC ⊑sec τA)
(MergeSec-REF) (E , when G(v, c) then S(v) end) ∧ (F , when H(v, c) then S(v) end) ∧ (τ ⊢ Γ{E}Γ′) ∧ (τ ⊢ Γ{F}Γ′′)
=⇒ EF , (when G(v, c) ∨H(v, c) then S(v) end) ∧ (τ ⊢ Γ {EF} Γ′ ⊔ Γ′′) ∧ (Γ′ ⊔ Γ′′ ⊑sec Γ)
(NewEvtSec-REF) I(vA) ∧ J(vA,vC) ∧ GC(vC , cC) ∧ ΨC(vC ,v
′
C) ∧ (ΓC ⊢ vC : τC) ∧ (Γ
′
C ⊢ v
′
C : τ
′
C)
=⇒ J(vA,v
′
C) ∧ (V (v
′
C) ∈ N) ∧ (V (v
′
C) < V (vC)) ∧ (τ
′
C ⊑sec τC)
Table III
TIME-SENSITIVE SECURE REFINEMENT RULES FOR MODEL EVENTS.
threaded languages, and enforce the timing behaviour of
a program to be independent of secrets by using padding
techniques. Russo et. al [11] propose a method to track and
close internal timing channels in multi-threaded programs by
doing transformation. Through this channel, the information
is leaked when the secrets affect the timing behaviour of a
thread. Intuitively, the internal timing leaks are introduced
by low assignment after high conditionals. To close this
channel, a fork is introduced by the transformation when
the branches depend on high data. Agat [12] studies the
problem of detecting and removing timing leaks. A type
system is proposed to prevent the time-sensitive information
leakage, and a transformation is performed to remove the
timing leaks from programs regarding to a bisimulation
based semantic security condition. The programs satisfying
the security condition do not leak any secret information
directly, indirectly, via timing channels, or by termination
behaviour to the external observers. By padding the branch-
ing commands, timing leaks is removed in the transformed
program. Hendin and Sands [13] extend Agat’s work for the
treatment of an object oriented language. Barthe et. al [14]
introduce a program transformation to prevent timing and
termination leaks in a sequential object-oriented language
via transaction mechanisms.
In addition to type-based treatments, there are also other
attempts to deal with secure information flow control for
programs. Rustan, Leino and Joshi [15] introduce a low level
counter variable to record execution time for the purpose
of reasoning about covert flows involving timing behaviour.
This enforcement is very strong and over pessimistic since
the counter variable need to be updated after each com-
mand and all high branching commands will be considered
introducing implicit flows. Ko¨pf and Basin [16] study a
parameterised notion of information flow security for the
analysis of timing side channels in synchronous hardware
circuits. The synchronous system is modelled as an automa-
ton with output. The flow security notion (RIRO-secure)
is based on the idea that the observational equivalence of
states is a partial equivalence relation (PER), i.e., the system
can be formalised as the PER model of secure information
flow [17]. The quantity of timing sensitive information
leakage of the system is approximated by counting distin-
guishable behaviours. Hammer and Snelting [18] present an
approach for information flow control in program analysis
based on program dependence graphs (PDG). Based on [18],
[19] extends the PDG-based flow analysis by incorporating
refinement techniques via path conditions to improve the
precision of the flow control. Such PDG-based information
flow control is more precise but more expensive than type-
based approaches and there is no timing flow treatment.
In a software development cycle, it is important to ensure
security from the very beginning at the specification level.
However, there has been no treatment for flow analysis
and control in abstract specification languages and security
preservation under refinement in the above works. There
have been a number of works addressing flow analysis in
Event-B, but without considering timing leakage [20], [21],
[1]. Mu [1] presents a type system for flow control in Event-
B models. Iliasov [20] handles the interference between or-
dered events introduced by a set of conditions formulated on
a machine for flow control. Bendisposto et. al [21] derive a
flow graph structure from an Event-B model specification to
manage the information about dependence and independence
of events for flow analysis. Comparing with these works, we
have presented a framework to reason about time sensitive
flow control in specification language and relevant relations
of the stepwise refinement transformations.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigates the problem of preserving time-
sensitive information flow security in timed Event-B speci-
fication models and in the process of refinement. We have
introduced a framework for reasoning about the secure
flow property in Event-B and under refinement. We extend
the Event-B system with timing constructs, and present a
security type system for the timed Event-B model with
time-sensitive information flow control. We then extend
the refinement rules to preserve secure information flow
properties under abstraction refinement.
We have presented a general framework for formally
reasoning about preserving time-sensitive flow secrecy prop-
erties in a specification language and the process of ab-
straction refinements. We believe this is a promising starting
point for a comprehensive formal treatment of information
flow security in specification languages and stepwise secure
refinements. There are a large number of programming
languages, which can be classified in terms of the paradigms
they support, such as imperative, object-oriented and real-
time languages. For future work, we propose to develop
combined theories for formal treatment of information se-
curity issues in different paradigms, and to explore the
relationships between them.
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